I study corporate risk management with property insurance in non-listed small and medium sized rms. I document negative relations between various ownership measures CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and insurance use as well as a positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use. These relations are consistent with self-insurance among CEO-controlled rms, rms with high ownership concentrations, rms with above average female owners and rms with a small number of family owners, given monopolistic insurance premium pricing practices. Indeed, I show that insurance premium and rm protability are positively related, implying that insurers raise premium when rm protability soars or implying that protable rms demand more coverage and other provisions. The above relations are also consistent with stakeholders stipulating less insurance the higher the CEO salary or the higher the ownership concentration, precisely because these rm characteristics proxy inversely for rm risk. This view is supported by negative relations between these ownership variables and the coe- 
Introduction
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence of a strong negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use, thereby rejecting the hypothesis that managers' and owners' risk aversion provide incentives to increase corporate hedging policies. One plausible interpretation of these relations is that insurers possess and exercise market power, hence corporate hedging with insurance is decreasing in managerial and owners risk aversion. Employing a simultaneous-equations model that recognizes the simultaneity of insurance use, leverage and liquidity shows, among other things, that insurance use and liquidity are risk management complements. Ownership variables show positive relations with liquidity, hereby supporting the hypothesis that managers' and owners' risk aversion provide incentives to implement and to extend corporate hedging policies.
Small and medium-sized rms are most sensitive to changes in exchange rate, interest rate, and other shocks such as catastrophic events. Despite the fact that one single event can wipe out a small business and, thus, small rms have stronger incentives, generally, to hedge than large rms, empirical work on corporate risk management has basically overlooked small rms. In addition, nearly all of the empirical literature on corporate risk management focuses on derivative use. However, small or private rms are not signicant users of derivatives. Specically, insurance use data oers one crucial advantage over derivative use data, namely, that exposures and the extent of hedging are easy to measure. Therefore, in this study, I exploit a unique database from an international insurance broker on property insurance purchases by small and medium-sized private Norwegian rms to study insurance use.
1
According to the accounting data, the average value of the insured assets is forty percent of the total assets. As a result, risk management with insurance is signicant to the survival 1 Accounting as well as ownership data from Scandinavia have received increased attention recently. See for example Bennedsen et al. (2007) employing data from Denmark, Sundgren and Wells (1998) studying Finnish rms, and Thorburn (2000) using data from Sweden. Signicantly, in Norway, all limited liability rms, listed and non-listed, face an identical accounting and reporting environment. For further information on the nature of the accounting and ownership data employed in this study, see Berzins et al. (2008) . of the rms in my sample.
An important empirical question is whether managers' and owners' risk aversion (Amihud and Lev (1981) , Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) ), provide incentives to implement corporate hedging policies. The risk aversion hypothesis implies that ownership variables and the extent of hedging or insurance use are positively related. However, the empirical evidence on the risk aversion hypothesis is mixed. Mayers and Smith (1982) , for example, argue that risk aversion cannot explain insurance demand by corporations. Unlike in public rms, owners of small and medium sized rms have, in general, tied their wealth to the rm. In addition, family rms stress survival and the welfare of stakeholders as important concerns and, thus, need to engage in risk management. Another hypothesis is, therefore, that the positive relation between ownership variables and the extent of insurance use is stronger or more relevant for non-listed rms. I, however, provide empirical evidence of a strong negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use.
2 These relations are inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis. I also provide empirical evidence of a positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use. This relation is also inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis since the risk aversion motive is expected to diminish in importance as the number of owners increases. Importantly, one cannot attribute these relations to an unobservable adverse private rm eect or to some peculiarity of Norwegian corporations since Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) , employing data on U.S. public rms, also nd negative relations between managerial ownership and 5% block owners and property insurance coverage.
The above relations between ownership variables and insurance use are consistent with over-insuring by rms with low or below average CEO salary and ownership variables, as well as with self-insurance among CEO or family controlled rms, given monopolistic insurance premium pricing practices. There exists anecdotal as well as empirical evidence on insurers 2 CEO ownership also shows a negative relation with insurance use. Because CEO ownership substantially reduces the sample size, it is excluded from the main analysis.
possessing and exercising market power. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) , for example, observe increases in property insurance premiums up to 300% within one year. Notably, Dafny (2008) documents that health insurers charge higher premiums to more protable rms. In my sample, I nd that in a regression of changes in premium on a constant, changes in protability, changes in property plus year and industry dummy variables, changes in profitability show a signicantly positive coecient. This relation implies that the insurers raise property premiums to rms that experience an increase in prots or that protable rms raise coverage.
The above relations are also consistent with stakeholders stipulating less insurance the higher the CEO salary or the higher ownership concentration, precisely because exposure to rm risk via salary or via ownership proxy inversely for rm risk. I analyze insurance use, leverage and liquidity jointly by employing simultaneous-equation regressions. This is an important matter because hedging, or insuring, may allow rms to increase debt capacity. Further, debt contracts frequently stipulate levels of insurance coverage, Smith (1995) . First, non-listed rms insure (hedge), as do listed rms, to increase their debt capacity. For the rms in my sample, it is also true that the debt ratio exerts a positive inuence on insurance use. This illustrates that non-listed rms do not dier from public rms in this respect (Graham and Rogers (2002) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) ). Second, I nd that insurance use exerts a positive inuence on corporate liquidity.
I also nd the converse, that corporate liquidity exerts a positive inuence on insurance use. This is the rst evidence that insurance and liquidity, both forms of active risk management, 3 These relations are also consistent with a lack of incentive for CEOs and owners with large ownership interests to hedge states with too low cash ow. However, it appears challenging to provide empirical evidence to support this scenario.
are complements. The view that cash and insurance are complements is supported by Rochet and Villeneuve (2008) who nd, in a model where the rm's liquidity management interacts with Brownian risk (hedged with derivatives) and with Poisson risk (hedged with insurance), that cash-poor rms should not insure whereas cash-rich rms should insure. Third, although insurance and liquidity are complements, rms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity.
Liquidity exerts a negative inuence on long-term debt and long-term debt exerts a negative inuence on liquidity. Hence, long-term debt and liquidity are substitutes.
The last two points are related to Acharya et al. (2007) who argue that cash is held as a hedging instrument rather than as negative debt by nancially constrained rms. They show theoretically and provide empirical evidence supporting the theory that constrained rms with high hedging needs prefer higher cash to lower debt, but rms with low hedging needs prefer lower debt to higher cash. Although the aims of this paper dier from the ones in Acharya et al. (2007) , I nevertheless nd that cash serves two purposes: it is a hedging instrument (complement with insurance), but may also be interpreted as negative debt (substitute for long-term debt). The latter view is supported by Opler et al. (1999) who show that rm characteristics known to be empirically associated with low debt are also associated with high cash.
To the extent that insurance use, leverage and liquidity are simultaneously determined, these rm policies are likely to be aected by the same variables. Accordingly, it is possible that managerial and owners risk aversion motives matter for leverage and liquidity. Indeed, I nd that ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership show positive relations with liquidity, which is consistent with a risk aversion motivated hedge.
The empirical methods used help reduce potential simultaneous-equations bias. In one extension, I employ forecasted rm characteristics rather than prior values for the explanatory variables. This is an important matter as all explanatory variables are at least partially endogenous. Overall, I nd that the results of the paper are robust to this extension as well as to various other robustness checks.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains a brief literature review. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains the main empirical analysis. Section 5 contains empirical evidence that explains the negative relation between ownership variables and insurance use. Section 6 contains robustness checks, and conclusions are provided in Section 7. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data, Appendix B contains sign predictions, while Appendix C briey describes the data forecasting method.
Literature Review
This paper is related to four strands of research and aims at complementing and extending previous works by focusing on private rms and by employing ownership variables such as aggregate female ownership or number of family owners. To my knowledge, none of the papers in the corporate risk management literature treat liquidity as an endogenous variable that interplays with derivative use, insurance use, or leverage. I also extend the literature by providing evidence of a relation between ownership variables and liquidity.
In the derivative use literature, Tufano (1996) , Schrand and Unal (1998) and Graham and Rogers (2002) , nd that hedging increases with managerial ownership. Studies that fail to nd a signicant relation between managerial risk aversion and hedging with derivatives include Gezcy et al. (1997 ), Haushalter (2000 and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) . Although Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000) nd that hedging is decreasing in managerial option ownership, it has been argued, Rogers (2002) , that the lack of evidence for the risk aversion motive may be a result of poor proxy variables for executive option holdings. Assuming that managerial compensation schemes are jointly determined enables Coles et al. (2006) to show that option delta and vega aect rm policy. On the one hand, these ndings suggest that the overall evidence for the risk aversion motive driven by equity exposure is, at best, weak. On the other hand, managerial risk aversion does seem to aect rms' policies, including hedging with derivatives, when managers hold executive options. Note, however, that executive options are not included in my data.
Another smaller strand of the literature studies corporate risk management with insurance (Mayers and Smith (1982) , Mayers and Smith (1987) , Mayers and Smith (1990), Yamori (1999) , Hoyt and Kang (2000) , Zou et al. (2003) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) ).
Within this strand, only Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) analyze managerial ownership, institutional ownership and block-owners' inuence on corporate insurance use. They report, consistent with the results presented in this paper, negative relations between block owners and insurance coverage and between managerial ownership and insurance coverage.
To my knowledge, only Vickery (2008) studies risk management practices in non-listed rms by investigating how these rms adjust their interest rate exposure via xed-rate or variable-rate loans. He provides evidence for why rms engage in risk management through standard arguments, such as due to nancial constraints, and draws on two surveys. According to this study, owners do not have a signicant eect on the risk management decision.
Specically, Vickery (2008) employs, among other ownership-related variables, the owner's age and the concentration of ownership, but nds no relation. The only evidence supporting the risk aversion motive is that adjustable-rate loans are more common among rms with wealthier owners, which is consistent with the notion that risk aversion is declining with increased wealth. This paper is also related to the growing literature on corporate liquidity. Recent contributions include Bates et al. (2008) who show that cash ratios increase over time because cash ows of rms become riskier and because rms change, as well as Lins et al. (2008) , who show that rms hold more cash in countries with greater agency problems. Other notable papers addressing corporate liquidity include Kim et al. (1998) , Opler et al. (1999 ), Dittmar et al. (2003 , Almeida et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Wang (2006) .
The Data
The insurance data are property insurance contracts of Norwegian non-listed limited liability rms obtained from Aon Grieg, an international insurance broker. Business interruption contracts are separately available and I therefore exclude these contracts from the analysis.
The original panel data set contains more than 1,653 rm-year observations, ranging from January, 2003 through May, 2006. The Aon database contains a few publicly-listed companies, but the vast majority of the data is for non-listed rms. Therefore, I focus attention on non-listed rms. To be included in the analysis, each insurance observation is matched with accounting data from the CCGR database, which is based on data from CreditInform, 4 when available.
5 An account of the selection and matching procedure is provided in Appendix A. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of sample rm's property insurance premium data. Premium is the annual insurance premium in Norwegian Kroner (NOK). The nal sample contains insurance premiums for 933 rms with 1,855 rm-year observations. The mean (median) for the insurance premium is NOK 192, 432 (45, 848). 6 The data show wide variation (across rms and to a lesser extent over time) as evidenced by the dierence between the minimum (164) and maximum (15, 281, 813) observation. Firms with positive long-term debt ratio show a mean (median) for the insurance premium of 242,512.60 (68,770) while rms with no long-term debt show a mean (median) for the insurance premium of 127,210.70 (29,240.50) . Although rms with positive long-term debt ratio show a substantially higher mean and median premium as well as lower skew in premium than rms with no long-term debt, both group of rms exhibit a similar wide variation in premiums.
I follow Mayers and Smith (1982) , Mayers and Smith (1987) , Mayers and Smith (1990) , Yamori (1999) , Hoyt and Kang (2000) and Zou et al. (2003) in interpreting the insurance premium as a proxy for the extent of property coverage. Indeed, Aunon-Nerin and Ehling 4 See www.creditinform.no. 5 The accounting and ownership database are maintained at the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at BI -The Norwegian School of Management. For additional information on the data, see Berzins et al. (2008) .
6 EUR 1 = NOK 8.80 on 9 April 2009. (2008) argue that their results are practically unchanged when replacing coverage with premium. The analysis below also assumes that the leasing of property, which is unobservable, does not systematically aect insurance coverage and, in particular, the simultaneity between cash, debt, and insurance.
Since rms dier in their needs for property insurance, it is important to scale the premium with property, plant and equipment plus inventories (PP&E+I), which represents the dependent variable employed in this study. Because of extreme outliers of the insurance ratio, the smallest and largest one percent are excluded from the analysis and from Table 1 .
See also Appendix A for further information regarding outliers. Table 1 also contains the property insurance premium to dividends and the property insurance premium to earnings ratio. Both measures suggest that corporate spending on insurance premiums is economically signicant. The value of the insured assets is significant too as the mean of PP&E+I to total assets is greater than thirty percent, reaching forty percent for the subsample with positive long-term debt ratio. This implies that risk management with insurance must be signicant to the survival of these rms. Table 1 also shows the descriptive statistics for two subsamples, namely rms with positive long-term debt and rms with zero long-term debt. Firms with zero long-term debt are smaller (not reported) and pay smaller insurance premium. Another dierence between the subsamples, namely the mean of the insurance ratio, which is statistically signicant, may be interpreted as implying that rms with zero long-term debt purchase more insurance per unit of property. This interpretation is plausible since most property insurance contracts cover replacement costs: other rm characteristics, such as rm age or the average age of property, are less likely to cause the higher insurance ratio for rms with zero long-term debt.
An alternative and also plausible interpretation is that insurers systematically discriminate against smaller rms.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 reports the distribution of sample rms across industries and the number of [Insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum) of the corporate accounting variables which, according to corporate nance theory, motivate the purchase of insurance. I employ the following explanatory variables related to incentives for corporate insurance use. CASH is cash and equivalents divided by assets. CEOSALARY is the CEO salary divided by assets times 1,000. CONCENTRA-7 Of the 1,618 rm-years for which the insurance ratio is available, 299 observations have a missing value for the industry group variable. However, I note that, based on the data available for the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , no rm appears to change the industry classication code in my subsample of the population. Therefore, I ll in missing values with the industry code for the same rm if it is available for at least one year. This results in only 6 cases with missing industry classications for the sample of rms with available insurance ratio.
TION is the Herndahl index of equity ownership.
8 DIV is dividends scaled by total equity. FAMILYSIZE is number of family owners of the largest family. LTD stands for the book value of long-term debt divided by assets. FEMALE is aggregate female ownership divided by 100. INSTOWN is institutional ownership divided by 100. INTANGASSETS is intangible assets scaled by total assets. OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales. PP&E is property, plant, and equipment as a percentage of assets. ROA is the return on assets (operating earnings over assets). SALESGROWTH is the three-year moving average percentage growth in sales. SALES is the logarithm of sales. SIZE stands for the logarithm of assets.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
One can see from Table 3 that rms with zero long-term debt substantially dier from rms with positive long-term debt. For instance, rms with zero long-term debt show a higher mean for CASH, higher mean for CEOSALARY, higher mean for DIV, etc. These dierences between means are highly statistically signicant.
Because I rely on standard variables for the corporate nance incentives to hedge, or insure, I do not elaborate on the proxies or their sign predictions, and refer the interested reader to the Data Appendix and the literature (Nance et al. (1993) , Gezcy et al. (1997) , Graham and Rogers (2002) , Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) ).
In previous versions of this paper, I employed various other standard risk management related variables. These variables, for example, number of employees, did not add explanatory power to the regressions or represent yet another proxy, R&D versus SALES GROWTH, for the same hedging motive. Results with alternative specications are available upon request.
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Finally, untabulated correlation coecients of the explanatory variables, along with the insurance ratio, are low, mostly insignicant, and thus suggest that colinearity problems will 8 The ndings presented below are robust to various other ways (percentage of the largest owner and logarithm of the number of owners) of calculating ownership concentration.
9 Variables excluded from the main analysis of the paper include: average family owner size, cash divided by current liabilities, CEO is member of largest family owner, CEO ownership, chair is member of largest family owner, convertible loans divided by the book value of assets, CreditInform debt rating divided by 100, debt equity ratio, direct ownership of all family owners, direct ownership of largest family, dividends per share to earnings per share, logarithm of number of employees, number of seats of largest family owner, regional dummy variables, ultimate ownership of all family owners and ultimate ownership of largest family. not aect the regressions presented below. The only exception is the rather high correlation, 0.7, between SALES and SIZE. As I argue in Section 6, the high correlation between these two rm characteristics raises the hurdle for nding robust evidence for the various hedging theories and therefore does not drive my results.
Empirical Findings
This section studies whether corporate property insurance purchases of non-listed rms are explained by standard proxies that aim at measuring corporate nance hedging motives.
Pearson correlation coecients, OLS regressions, and other regression models are untabulated, but available upon request. I focus the discussion on results of linear GMM simultaneous equations with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent p-values. Many of the explanatory variables are at least partially endogenous. I control for simultaneity between the insurance ratio, liquidity, and capital structure. For exogenous variables, the regressions below are based on lagged data to reduce potential simultaneous-equations bias. Table 4 [Insert Table 4 about here] CEOSALARY, CONCENTRATION, and FEMALE show negative and signicant coe-cient estimates in the INSURANCE equation of Table 4 . These results are inconsistent with the risk aversion motive put forward in Amihud and Lev (1981) , Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) .
The relation between the dividend yield and insurance use is negative and signicant.
This result complements the evidence in Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) on public rms.
They argue that if dividends and free cash ow are positively related, then a rm with high dividends is less likely to fail to rebuild when a casualty loss occurs. Their argument is consistent with the evidence in Allen and Michaely (2003) that the greater part of total dividends are paid by large and protable rms with low information asymmetry. The above relation is also consistent with the view that if dividends are high, then the under-investment problem is small due to the negative relation between dividends and the investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts (1992) ).
According to Grace and Rebello (1993) , favorable information may be signaled through a high level of insurance coverage and vice versa. DeMarzo and Due (1991) , DeMarzo and Due (1995) and Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) also provide models of informational asymmetry that motivate hedging. Informational asymmetries are expected to be lower for rms with high institutional ownership than for rms with low institutional ownership.
However, the empirical evidence for this hedging incentive is weak or even inconsistent with the predictions. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) nd no relation between institutional ownership and property insurance coverage. Purnanandam (2008) The negative relation between INSTOWN and INSURANCE, which is insignicant, in Table 4 appears, at rst, to support the informational asymmetry hedging motive. However, it is not clear to whom the rms may signal through insurance. Since non-listed rms rarely attract outside investors, it is more likely that institutional investors either directly or indirectly inuence the rms in my sample to reduce insurance.
To control for protability, I use ROA. In Table 4 , ROA shows a signicant coecient estimate with negative sign, which is consistent with the sign of DIV. It is also consistent with the view that high dividends imply greater free cash ow and that dividends are typically paid by protable rms. SIZE shows predicted sign but is insignicant. This may be due to the rather small variability of rm size in the data. Recall that the rms in the database need to reach a certain size to justify an insurance broker. This excludes very small rms. Focusing on rms with positive LTD also removes smaller rms. Since insurance data on listed rms is scarce in my sample (and excluded from the analysis), many large rms were automatically excluded.
Hence, the nature of my data and the selection procedure implies limited cross-sectional variation in rm size.
The variable SALESGROWTH, a proxy for growth options, shows a negative sign and is insignicant. This hedging argument is based on the idea that it is optimal for rms with growth options to reduce cash ow variability. Note that Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) argue that insurance only aects cash ow variability indirectly, via the insurance deductible. Since I use insurance premium, which proxies for insurance coverage rather than for the insurance deductible, it appears that the insignicant coecient estimate for SALESGROWTH is plausible.
The simultaneous-equation regressions setting allows for controlling for insurance use due to debt demand. This is an important matter because hedging or insurance may allow rms to increase debt capacity. Too, rms with high debt may be contracted with debtors to insure. I provide the rst evidence into this important question for non-listed rms. Indeed, non-listed rms insure (hedge), as suggested by Table 4 , to increase their debt capacity.
For the rms in my sample, it is also true that the debt ratio exerts a positive inuence on insurance use. This shows that non-listed rms do not dier from public rms in this respect, Graham and Rogers (2002) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) . Next, note that INSURANCE exerts a positive inuence on corporate liquidity, CASH. Signicantly, I also nd that the insurance-liquidity relation exists in reverse, in that CASH exerts a positive inuence on INSURANCE. This is the rst evidence that insurance and liquidity, both forms of risk management, are complements. Although insurance and liquidity are complements, rms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity. Table 4 shows that liquidity exerts a negative inuence on long-term debt, and that long-term debt exerts a negative inuence on liquidity. Therefore, long-term debt and liquidity behave as substitutes.
The view that liquidity serves two purposes, namely to hedge as well as to directly or indirectly reduce debt, is consistent with Acharya et al. (2007) . They argue that cash is held as a hedging instrument rather than as negative debt by nancially constrained rms with high hedging needs.
Next, I turn to the LTD and CASH regression results in Table 4 . The coecient estimates in the LTD equation, in Table 4 Table 4 . DIV, in Table 4 , is highly signicant and shows a positive sign whereas [Insert Table 5 about here]
To the extent that insurance use, leverage and liquidity are simultaneously determined, these rm policies are likely to be aected by the same explanatory variables. Specically, what is the inuence of managerial and owners' risk aversion for leverage and liquidity? The simultaneous-equation regression model in Table 5 re-estimates the model in Table 4 using CONCENTRATION and FEMALE also in the LTD and in the CASH equation.
In Table 5 , the coecients yield slightly dierent results in signicance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 . CEOSAL is now insignicant and INSTOWN is only slightly insignicant, whereas in Table 4 , INSTOWN shows a p-value of 0.22 in the INSURANCE regression. In the LTD regression, there is almost no change in signicance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 , except that the p-value of OPEX drops from 0.14 to 0.11. The coecients in the CASH regression of Table 5 yield identical results in signicance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 . Note also that there is not one single sign change in Table   5 relative to Table 4 [Insert Table 6 Table 6 , the coecients yield again slightly dierent results in signicance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 and   Table 5 . Overall, the previous results appear robust. The risk aversion hypothesis for owners is expected to become less important when the number of owners increases. FAMILYSIZE, however, shows a signicantly positive relation with INSURANCE. This result underscores the coecient estimates of CONCENTRATION and FEMALE, which also show unexpected sign. Further, FAMILYSIZE shows signicantly negative relation with CASH, which is consistent with a risk aversion motivated hedge.
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that corporate insurance use is aected, and quite signicantly so, by ownership structure and the CEO's private motives. In addition, non-listed rms insure to increase their long-term debt capacity; insurance and liquidity are complements; and liquidity and long-term debt are substitutes.
Explaining the Negative Relation between Ownership Variables and Insurance
In this section, I present two pieces of empirical evidence that may explain the strong negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use.
Dafny (2008) argues that health insurers exploit more protable rms. If this is also a common practice in the property insurance industry, then, on the one hand, it is conceivable that rms with low CEO salary, low ownership concentration, low female ownership or a general high dispersion of ownership ignore or even facilitate monopolistic insurance premium pricing practices. On the other hand, rms with high levels of ownership concentration, in one way or another, probably respond to overpriced insurance contracts by cutting back on coverage and thus also on premium. Obviously, the motive to cut back on coverage may be stronger than the risk aversion hedging motive, which then explains the negative relation.
Results in Panel A of Table 7 support the view that insurers exploit more protable rms.
The table contains regressions of changes in premium on a constant, changes in protability, lagged changes in protability, changes in PP&E+I and lagged changes in PP&E+I plus year and industry dummy variables. Changes in protability, lagged changes in protability or both show signicantly positive coecients, implying that insurers raise property premiums to rms that experience an increase in prots.
Of course, an alternative interpretation, which I cannot rule out, is that protable rms raise coverage or incorporate other, potentially expensive provisions, into their property insurance contracts. Importantly, both interpretations help explain why I nd a strong negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use. In any case, if protable rms do raise coverage, this practice would be less common among rms with high ownership concentration.
[Insert Table 7 Overall, the evidence in Table 7 supports the view that managers' and owners' risk aversion matter. The negative relation between ownership variables and insurance use may be due to monopolistic insurance premium, waste, negative relation between ownership and rm risk or all of these relations.
11 Coecient estimates of female ownership and number of owners in largest family are highly insignicance and thus excluded from the regressions.
Robustness
The results presented above are robust to various ways of treating outliers. For example, dropping observations of the insurance variable at 5% (on both sides of the distribution), instead of 1%, or keeping outliers of the explanatory variables in the sample, see Appendix A, does not alter the main ndings of this paper.
Next, I address the high correlation between SALES and SIZE. Note that the correlation between these two rm characteristics aects only rst-stage estimates since only one of the two variables appears in the three second-stage regressions. This, however, only raises the hurdle for nding robust that is, signicant evidence for the various hedging theories that are tested for in this paper. Moreover, when I exclude one of the highly correlated variables in each of the three rst-stage regressions, I then obtain coecient estimates in the second-stage which are almost identical to the reported results. Unsurprisingly, the signicance of the coecient estimates is slightly higher in this experiment when compared with the signicance of the coecient estimates in Table 4 . Tables 4 to 6 are obtained by using data for the scal year-end prior to the start of the insurance contract. First, when the data from the scal year-end after the insurance policy was initiated is used, similar results are obtained.
The exogenous variables in
Second, I also construct an additional sample by using a standard practice in the risk management literature: that is, selecting stock data from the nancial year before the insurance contract was initiated and ow data from the same year as the insurance contract.
This specication assumes that management relies on past stock data but has good estimates available for current ow data. Gezcy et al. (1997) , for example, use this procedure. Overall, I nd that the qualitative results are unaected by changes in the matching and selection criteria between the insurance data and the exogenous variables.
Third, the main results also hold if the three-year moving average is used instead of the lagged values for the exogenous variables, or if, alternatively, all variables are averaged across all years for which insurance data is available, resulting in a purely cross-sectional model. Fourth, since there is substantial time-series dependence in the explanatory variables, it is desirable to incorporate this feature of the data into the empirical analysis. Furthermore, all rm policies, including insurance use, should depend on forecasted rm characteristics rather than on prior or current values. To address these concerns, I predict explanatory variables 12 such as rm size from an ARMA(1,1) model which is tted to the time-series of each accounting variable. Although employing predicted explanatory variables is more consistent with the notion that rms have well eshed-out business plans, at least for the near future, it appears that predicted rm characteristics do not outperform lagged balancesheet-based rm characteristics. One obvious reason predictions perform slightly worse than lagged data is that the prediction itself produces outliers.
To show that the sample is representative, I compare the descriptive statistics of the data to all CCGR data for the relevant years. The rms in the Aon Grieg database show somewhat higher sales and size than the average Norwegian non-listed rm. This is, of course, not surprising since smaller rms do not require an insurance broker. Another notable dierence between the sample of rms in the study and the population is that sales growth is lower for rms in this study than in the population, and yet, the median sales growth in my sample and the population are comparable. I, therefore, suspect that the dierence is due to a few rms with stellar sales growth in the population group: these rms may be too small for an insurance broker and, thus, should not be in my database. Overall, I nd that the rms in my sample do not dier in an economically signicant way from the population of non-listed rms in Norway.
Finally, I re-estimate the models in Tables 4 to 6, but include the CEO ownership variable and ll in missing CEO ownership data with zeros.
13 One among the reasons why CEO ownership data is missing is the possibility that CEO ownership is too small to be recorded.
12 To my knowledge, Graham (1996) is the rst work that produces predicted data, namely corporate marginal tax rates, in the empirical corporate nance literature.
13 I have, in addition, hand-collected CEO ownership data via a questionnaire and replaced missing data with zero when industrial ownership equals 100 percent. Nevertheless, the models in Tables 4 to 6 cannot be identied when the original CEO ownership data are included. I, therefore, nd it plausible to replace missing data with zero. The results in Tables 4 to   6 are practically unchanged and CEO ownership shows a signicantly negative coecient, which is consistent with the results presented in Section 4.
Conclusions
I study corporate risk management with property insurance in non-listed small and mediumsized rms. This is important because owners, including the CEO, of small and medium-sized rms have, in general, tied their wealth to the rm. Therefore, it is expected that the risk management motives of owners and managers are much more aligned in small and mediumsized rms than in large public companies. In addition, family rms stress survival and, thus, need to rely on risk management.
I document negative relations between the following ownership variables: CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and between insurance use. I also document a positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use. These relations are inconsistent with the risk aversion motive to hedge. However, the relations are consistent with self-insurance among CEO-controlled rms, rms with high ownership concentrations, rms with above average female owners and rms with a small number of family owners, given monopolistic insurance premiums. I provide empirical evidence that supports this view by showing that insurers raise property insurance premiums for rms that experience increases in prots. The above relations are also consistent with stakeholders stipulating less insurance the higher the CEO salary or the higher the ownership concentration. This may be because these rm characteristics proxy for below average rm risk. I also provide empirical evidence that supports this view by establishing that ownership variables and the coecient of variation of revenues are negatively related.
Moreover, I analyze insurance, capital structure, and liquidity choices jointly by employing simultaneous-equation regressions. This is an important matter because insurance, as well as liquidity, may allow rms to increase debt capacity. The results suggest that nonlisted rms insure to increase their debt capacity. The results also suggest that insurance and liquidity, both forms of risk management, are complements. Although insurance and liquidity are complements, rms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity. I nd that long-term debt and liquidity behave as substitutes.
A Data Description
This appendix contains details about the construction of the variables employed in this study. All reported regressions are performed with prior period data. Regression output with a mixture of prior period and current period data (see Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) and Gezcy et al. (1997) ), current data and data with predicted explanatory variables are available upon request.
A.1 Insurance Data
The data from Aon Grieg are insurance property premiums. The le contains the rm name, gross premium, net premium, and a few other items. The insurance data are merged with the accounting data by matching with the rm name. Firms that cannot be uniquely identied are removed.
A.2 Explanatory Variables
Item numbers are CCGR variable denitions.
ASSETS: Assets is the sum of current asset and xed asset. CASH: I eliminate the 6 cases in which CASH is higher than 1. DIV: I allow the dividend-to-equity ratio to be less than 4, removing a total of 18 observations.
INTANGASSETS: Negative intangible assets are removed. LTD: I eliminate the 16 observations for which LTD is larger than 3. Cases with longterm debt ratio higher than 1 (but lower than 3) are kept in the sample, in order to capture the eects of severe nancial distress.
OPEX: I remove operating expenses to sales ratio at 99 percent. In addition, cases with negative operating expenses are set to missing.
ROA: I remove one observation with an ROA of -28. SALES GROWTH: Observations for which the percentage growth in sales in a given year is higher than 10 (1000 percent) are eliminated. This reduces the number of observations of the SALES GROWTH variable by one percent.
B Sign Predictions
This appendix contains the predictions for the variables used in the study. CASH: variable is not included in LTD regressions in Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) and Graham and Rogers (2002) .
INSURANCE: positive inuence, see Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) . SALES GROWTH: negative inuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002) . INTANGASSETS: positive inuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002) . OPEX: no prediction. SALES: negative inuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002) .
PP&E: positive inuence, see Graham and Rogers (2002 rm. This avoids endogeneity problems that arise when using current values, and is more rened than using simple lags.
I produce two additional versions of the ARMA(1,1) model forecasts. First, when the forecasts are lower than the minimum of the actual time-series or when the forecasts are higher than the maximum of the actual time-series, then these observations are assumed to be missing. Second, when the forecasts are lower than the minimum of the actual time-series or when the forecasts are higher than the maximum of the actual time-series, then these forecasts are replaced with the minimum or maximum of the actual series. 
